The Consequences and Management of Capital Inflows: Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa by Reinhart, Carmen & Calvo, Guillermo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Consequences and Management of
Capital Inflows: Lessons for Sub-Saharan
Africa
Carmen Reinhart and Guillermo Calvo
University of Maryland, College Park, Department of Economics
1999
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7901/
MPRA Paper No. 7901, posted 24. March 2008 00:25 UTC
 
First draft: August, 1997 
This version: April 4, 1998 
  
 The Consequences and Management of Capital Inflows: Lessons for Sub-Saharan Africa1 
 
 Guillermo A.  Calvo 
 University of Maryland 
 College Park, Maryland 20741 
 (301) 405-7006 
 FAX (301) 403-8107 
 calvo@econ.umd.edu 
  
 
 Carmen M.  Reinhart 
 University of Maryland 
 College Park, Maryland 20741 
 (301) 405-7006 
 FAX (301) 403-8107 
 creinhart@puafmail.umd.edu 
  
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared for a Study on Changes in International Trade and Finance: Consequences for 
Development Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors would like to thank Stephany Griffith-Jones and 
participants in the EGDI meeting on October 9, 1997 for useful comments and suggestions and Todd Johnston for 
excellent research assistance. 
 I.  Introduction 
The return of foreign private capital to East Asian and Latin American countries in the 1990s 
has attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers alike.  Indeed, this phenomenon has been the 
subject of a substantial literature in recent years.2  The Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 and the recent 
Asian crises notwithstanding, capital inflows are seen as a way in which developing countries can 
finance higher levels of consumption, investment, and growth. Yet, during much of this period there 
have been few signs that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were at all affected by the renewed 
interest that international investors were showing in emerging market economies.  
Throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s, capital flows to these countries were dominated by 
official transfers, as foreign private capital shied away.3  Net financial flows to this region still 
remain modest, at about U.S. $12 billion during 1996, and not appreciably higher than they were in 
1991 (Table 1).  By contrast, financial flows to Asia and Latin America more than doubled during 
this period to U.S. $101 billion and U.S. $66 billion, respectively.  Furthermore, with the exception 
of South Africa, portfolio flows, which is one of the fastest growing sources of capital for emerging 
market economies in the 1990s, to SSA have been negligible. Indeed, there are less than a dozen 
global funds that specialize in non-South Africa “Pan Africa” economies.4   
However, by 1992 there were signs that a few African countries, notably Kenya and Uganda, 
had begun to attract private capital inflows and, following the 1994 elections, South Africa joined 
the ranks of capital importers.  More recently, in 1996, Nigeria and Zimbabwe began to attract the 
attention of foreign investors; as shown in Griffith-Jones, Bhinda, and Martin (1997), Nigeria 
                                                 
2 See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1995) and Montiel and Reinhart (1997) for a discussion of this 
literature. 
3 See World Bank (1997). 
4 See Griffith-Jones, Bhinda, and Martin (1997). 
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 Table 1.  Net Financial Flows by Region: 1990-1996 
 (In billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Region: 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
All developing 
 
60.2 
 
156.9 
 
143.1 
 
165.1 
 
138.3 
 
182.1 
 
196.5 
 
Africa 
 
7.3 
 
11.4 
 
14.2 
 
10.9 
 
18.2 
 
17.6 
 
15.4 
 
Africa:  Sub Sahara 
 
8.4 
 
12.5 
 
9.2 
 
10.4 
 
13.7 
 
14.8 
 
13.0 
 
Asia 
 
35.7 
 
46.1 
 
41.1 
 
73.4 
 
75.9 
 
100.3 
 
111.7 
 
Asia:  excluding China and India 
 
26.4 
 
32.7 
 
34.3 
 
44.5 
 
39.0 
 
59.2 
 
66.2 
 
Middle East and Europe 
 
0.4 
 
74.3 
 
41.5 
 
27.9 
 
7.9 
 
11.3 
 
13.6 
 
Western Hemisphere 
 
18.6 
 
28.2 
 
53.5 
 
62.8 
 
43.2 
 
58.4 
 
66.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. 
 
 accounts for about half of the foreign direct investment (FDI) to the SSA region.  As these inflows 
persisted, many of the less desirable side-effects of capital inflows also became manifest.  Nominal 
and real exchange rate pressures emerged, and countries such as Kenya, Uganda and South Africa 
experienced a pronounced appreciation in the real exchange rate.5  As the monetary authorities 
attempted to stem the appreciation by intervening in the market for foreign exchange, reserve 
accumulation accelerated and monetary control became more difficult.  Attempts to sterilize the 
foreign exchange transaction through either open market operations or increases in reserve 
requirements often drove domestic nominal and real interest rates higher, acting as a further stimulus 
                                                 
5 See Asea and Reinhart (1996) for a multi country study, Kahn (1996) for South Africa, Kibei, Mjema and 
Tarimo (1997) for Tanzania, Kasekende and Kitabire (1997) for Uganda, and Matale, Mwanawina, Matale, and 
Mweetwa (1997) for Zambia. 
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to inflows and increasing debt-servicing costs for the government and the central bank.6 
                                                 
6These effects of the sterilization policies are not limited to the African countries, as several Asian, Eastern 
European, and Latin American countries had similar experiences (see Reinhart and Dunaway, 1995, and Montiel and 
Reinhart, 1997). 
Some of the questions that emerge from the African experiences were echoing those of 
capital-importing countries in other regions:  To what extent are the capital inflows driven by 
external fundamentals?  Or conversely, what role have domestic macroeconomic policies and 
structural reforms played in attracting (or repelling) the flows? What is the appropriate policy 
response? Are the high domestic real interest rates a byproduct of financial liberalization or of 
monetary policy?  Is there evidence of regional “contagion effects?” Do capital inflows make the 
recipient economies more vulnerable to financial crises, such as those in Mexico in 1994-95 and in 
Asia in 1997-98? 
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Other questions are more specific to the African experience: Why has SSA not attracted more 
flows, despite a substantive improvement in economic performance?7 What are the prerequisites for 
attracting portfolio flows?  Are the policy instruments limited by the relatively undeveloped nature 
of the financial sector?  Is an undeveloped financial sector an asset or a liability when it comes to 
avoiding Asian-style crises? 
                                                 
7 See The Economist (June 14th-20th, 1997). 
The purpose of this paper is to answer some of these questions at both the conceptual level as 
well as in the African context.  The paper presents a framework to analyze the macroeconomic 
effects of and the policy responses to a surge in capital inflows. We examine the monetary 
consequences, the implications for the exchange rate and domestic inflation, and the issue of the 
current account and its sustainability.  The analysis places much emphasis on the role played by the 
financial sector and the stock market.  At the empirical level, we investigate the possible links 
between the structure and depth of existing capital markets and the volume and composition of  the 
capital flows a country attracts.  The aim is to assess to what extent policies designed to deepen the 
capital market may be successful in paving the way for increased portfolio inflows.  We also assess 
the possibility of regional contagion effects and gauge the responsiveness of capital flows to SSA to 
international interest rates.  The issue of contagion has received increasing attention, in light of 
crises that have engulfed several Asian economies.  In the case of Africa, we ask to what extent 
capital market developments in the “large” neighbors, such as Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, 
impact (for better or worse) the whole region.  Along the way, we compare the experiences of the 
countries that experienced a surge in capital inflows to those of countries facing similar 
circumstances in SSA.    
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  Sections II-V present a basic conceptual framework to analyze the effects of international 
capital movements and discusses some of the key  policy lessons.  In particular, Section III analyzes 
the monetary consequences of capital inflows and the role of banks, while Section IV examines 
exchange rate management issues.  The subject of current account sustainability is taken up in 
Section V.  Section VI and presents an empirical analysis of the links between equity market 
structure and capital flows, while the following section examines issues related to financial 
liberalization, capital flows, and banking and currency crises.  This section also provides evidence 
on regional contagion effects in SSA.  The main findings and areas for further research are discussed 
in the final section. 
   
II.  Basic Concepts and Effects 
We will start defining some concepts that will play a central role in the paper.  In the first 
place we define the current account deficit (of the balance of payments), CAD, as follows: 
 CAD = Imports - Exports - Net Factor Transfers from Rest of the World (1) 
These variables are usually presented in U.S. dollars and divided by GNP, a convention that we will 
follow here.  Net Factor Transfers include workers’ remittances (with a positive sign) and interest on 
external debt (with a negative sign if the stock of debt is positive, as is normally the case in African 
countries).  The CAD measures the rate at which the country is becoming indebted with the rest of 
the world.  Thus, if measured without error, it represents the growth of the country’s overall (i.e., 
including private and public sectors) net international indebtedness.  Several emerging markets have 
exhibited high CAD relative to their GNPs, often exceeding 8-10 percent.  Large CADs are always a 
motive for concern, but several East Asian countries have run large deficits for many years while 
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they exhibited sustained growth--of course, the recent currency crisis in Malaysia and Thailand 
suggests that large CADs may also be “unsustainable” in East Asia as well.  Yet, it is worth noting 
that the currency crises in Indonesia and Korea were not preceded by large current account deficits. 
International Reserves, R, are defined as official holdings of international short-term liquid 
assets issued by foreign governments (e.g., US Treasury Bills).  Normally, international reserves are 
held in the form of obligations incurred by hard-currency governments, e.g., U.S. dollars, 
Deutschemarks, etc, and are held at the domestic central bank.   
Capital Inflows, KI, are defined as follows: 
 KI = CAD +ΔR, (2) 
where _R denotes accumulation of international reserves.  Notice that KI - ΔR = growth of net 
international indebtedness.  Thus, capital inflows is a gross concept because it does not net out the 
accumulation of international reserves.8 
Capital Inflow episodes are defined as situation in which there is a sudden and persistent 
increase in KI.  For example, in Uganda capital outflows amounted to about 4 percent of GDP in 
1990--by 1995 (the peak inflow year) KI was registering a surplus of nearly 7 percent of GDP.  A 
stylized fact is that at the start of a capital inflow episode both international reserves and the current 
account deficit exhibit a sharp rise.  Eventually, however, reserve accumulation slows down and an 
increasing share of capital inflows take the form of a widening CAD. 
The expression “capital inflows” gives the impression that when KI rises more capital gets 
accumulated.  However, nothing could be farther from truth.  To illustrate this, we recall that the 
                                                 
8 In practice, the different concepts in equation (2) are measured by independent methods that do not add up 
as required by (2).  Hence, actual data includes errors and omissions.  The latter could be quite substantial.  Some 
studies have used it as a proxy for Capital Flight, i.e., illegal international financial transactions--these are quite 
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following is an identity in national accounting: 
 CAD = Total Consumption + Total Investment - GNP, (3) 
where “Total” stands for “government + private sector.”  Therefore, by equation (2) and (3), 
 KI = Total Consumption + Total Investment - GNP + ΔR. (4) 
Consequently, given GNP and _R, an increase in capital inflows must be reflected in a consumption 
and/or an investment boom.  For instance, in the case of Uganda capital inflows financed higher 
levels of both consumption and investment; in the case of Kenya investment remained largely 
unaffected; as shown in Kimei, Mjema, Tarimo, and Msutze (1997), in Tanzania the inflows 
financed higher consumption and a surge in imports. 
1.  Total Expenditure and Fiscal Implications 
                                                                                                                                                             
important for a number of African countries. 
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Typically, a capital inflows episode is associated with a rise in total expenditure (i.e., Total 
Consumption + Total Investment).  Thus, since some taxes rise with total expenditure (e.g., VAT, 
sales taxes, import tariffs), capital inflows tend to increase fiscal revenue and lower the fiscal deficit. 
 This effect has been shown to be important in several Latin American countries (see Talvi 1996) as 
well as in a number of African countries during commodity price booms (see Cuddington,1989).  
This is undoubtedly “good news” for policymakers but the phenomenon, if not well understood, 
could be taken as a sign that fiscal problems are beginning to be solved.  Actually, there is plenty of 
evidence of countries that having misunderstood the nature of the phenomenon, proceeded to 
increase public expenditure--the Nigerian example during the oil price boom of the late 1970s-early 
1980s is one of many African examples.9  Since the phenomenon is symmetric, fiscal revenue falls 
as capital inflows subside.  
Policy lesson, one: Countries that increase public expenditure in the expectation that 
the capital inflow is a permanent phenomenon, suffer a rude wake-up call as capital 
inflows come to an end and their temporarily high revenues erode.  In the context of 
SSA, treat all commodity price booms as if they were temporary--treat all 
commodity price declines as permanent. 
2.  Gross and Net Capital Flows:  The Stock Market 
                                                 
9  See Cooper (1993) and Cuddington (1989). 
Leaving aside the accumulation of international reserves, KI nets out all capital account 
transactions.  Therefore, for example, if the government privatizes the telephone company and uses 
the proceeds to pay back external debt, the combined operation will not show up in an increase or 
decrease in capital inflows as measured by KI.  The same is true if foreigners invest in the local 
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stock market and the former domestic owners of the stock deposit the proceeds in a bank account 
outside the country.  In many instances, these gross capital flows exceed in no small measure the net 
flows captured by KI.  What is the advantage or disadvantage of these transactions?  Obviously, they 
imply no net inflow or outflow, so the country will not benefit or be hurt by being able to spend 
more or less (recall equation (4)).  The potential benefit, however, is more subtle although 
potentially very important. 
Cross-border ownership has the advantage of allowing domestic and foreign residents to 
diversify risk.  In absence of cross-border ownership, domestic residents, for example, would be 
forced to invest all their wealth entirely on domestic assets.  If, for political or natural reasons, the 
country’s asset returns exhibit high volatility, then domestic residents will be subject to a welfare 
loss compared to the case where they are free to invest abroad.  Moreover, to the extent that 
domestic residents have no opportunities outside the country, policymakers could more easily resort 
to highly distortionary but easy to collect taxes like the wealth tax.   
Policy lesson, two: Allowing for capital mobility (i.e., cross-border ownership) acts 
as a disciplining device for policymakers, making it more difficult to resort to 
distortionary taxation. 
A key stylized fact associated with capital inflows episodes is Stock Market booms.  This 
stock market boom was a hallmark of the South African experience and, more recently the Nigerian 
and Zimbabwe cases, yet it hardly characterizes the experience of other African countries, an issue 
which we will take up later.10 The booms may not last during the whole period, they may start after 
                                                 
10 The market value of portfolio equity investment of emerging market funds in South Africa amounted to 
barely U.S. $4 million in September 1993--by December 1995 the comparable figure was U.S. $532 million (see 
Rea, 1996). 
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the initial surge of capital inflows and end before inflows completely subside.11  However, the 
existence of a boom during some of the capital inflows episode has been observed virtually 
everywhere among the more developed emerging markets.  This is explained by the fact that capital 
inflow episodes are triggered by factors that increase the rate of return differentials between the 
receiving country and the rest of the world.  These factors may be internal—e.g., end of a war, 
adoption of a sensible stabilization program—or external—e.g., fall in international interest rates.  
Naturally, therefore, external capital comes in search of more attractive returns, and the easiest place 
to find it is at the Stock Market.  Thus, the surge in the demand for stocks results in a sharp rise in 
price, i.e., a Stock Market boom.  
The Stock Market boom benefits local stock owners and increases social welfare: stock 
prices rise and nobody is hurt by that.  However, there are instances in which the initial well-
grounded boom gives rise to unrealistic expectations on the part of investors, and the boom 
continues beyond what could be explained by realistic asset return differentials.  More specifically, 
after the initial justified price rise, prices continue rising simply because individuals believe that 
prices will continue rising.  Eventually, the bubble bursts and many investors see their hopes 
shattered.  Not surprisingly, the recent crises in Asia also highlight that large capital outflows will be 
associated with an asset price collapse.  In addition, and as will be seen below when we discuss the 
financial sector, these purely speculative bubbles could threaten the stability of the financial sector 
and eventually result in a fiscally onerous bank bailout. 
                                                 
11  See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996). 
Policy lesson three: Be aware or marked increases in stock or real estate prices 
fueled by capital inflows and rapid credit creation, as these could reflect asset price 
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bubbles. 
3.  Debt Maturity, Bunching and International Reserves 
By definition, a capital inflows episode corresponds to a situation in which the government 
and/or the private sector are increasing the rate at which they fall into debt or lower their net wealth. 
 Issuing debt and selling stocks to foreign residents are two forms to “borrow.”  However, their 
contractual characteristics are very different.   
When a foreign resident purchases stocks of a  local firm, he is entitled to share in distributed 
profits and to vote in the company’s shareholders meetings.  The funds accruing to the investor, 
therefore, depends on the firm’s ability to generate, and willingness to distribute, profits.  Investors 
could actually lose the entire value of their investments if the firm goes bankrupt.  Barring fraudulent 
action by managers, investors have no legal recourse that could stop the loss.  In contrast, 
bondholders are some of the first in line for repayment, which in most cases is independent of the 
firm’s performance.  In fact, when firms are unable to repay their debts because of a macroeconomic 
disturbance (e.g., devaluation, foreign exchange controls), foreign creditors are occasionally able to 
put enough pressure on the local government so as to persuade it to take up nonperforming private 
sector loans.  
Moreover, debt maturity may also be an important factor.  Under normal circumstances, a 
10-year maturity obligation is not very different from a 1-year maturity obligation that is rolled over 
during the next 10 years.  Actually, since short-term interest rates are usually lower than long-term 
ones, the 1-year bond plus automatic rollover could look more attractive to the debtor.  However, 
their ranking for the debtor may change radically if there is no assurance that the debt rollover will 
take place.  For example, in December 1994, Mexico found it impossible to rollover a sizable stock 
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of maturing Tesobono (dollar-denominated public debt); Korea, Indonesia and Thailand faced 
similar problems in 1997-98.  South Africa, with a short-term debt to reserve ratio xx is particularly 
vulnerable in this regard.   
Policy lesson four: A high volume of short-term debt relative to the stock of 
international reserves can be a major problem if the country entered into a balance-
of-payments crisis.  South Africa, with a short-term debt to reserve ratio of xx is 
particularly vulnerable in this regard.   Short-term debt usually gives rise to the 
“bunching effect.”  
 
III.  Monetary Consequences 
As noted above, capital inflows have as a counterpart an increase in total expenditure or 
accumulation of international reserves.  However, these net operations are usually accompanied by 
domestic intermediation.  For example, an increase in international borrowing could be done directly 
by the final user of the funds (e.g., a firm implementing an investment project), or the operation may 
be intermediated in the domestic financial market.  For instance, a domestic bank may borrow the 
international funds and, in turn, lend them to the domestic user of the funds.  Direct loans require the 
firm or individual to have an international reputation.  Thus, direct loans are usually limited to large 
firms or multinationals.  In contrast, small- and medium-sized firms, SMFs, and consumers are 
constrained to borrow from domestic banks.  Consequently, international funds geared to SMFs and 
consumers are typically intermediated by banks. 
As a result, a capital inflows episode is usually accompanied by an increase in domestic 
banks’ liabilities.  The latter take several forms.  Some of these forms are recorded in banks’ balance 
 
 13 
sheets, e.g., banks’ certificates of deposits, and different types of bank deposits.  Other forms, 
however, are not recorded in usual bank balance sheets and are called off-balance-sheet items.  An 
example are Bank Acceptances by which a bank guarantees repayment of borrowed funds but the 
operation is, otherwise, equivalent to a direct loan to the final user.  Off-balance-sheet items come to 
light when the firm or individual borrower are unable to make the contractual repayment.  Thus, 
these items show very rapid growth in a crisis. 
Another reason for the growth of bank liabilities during a capital-inflows episode is that the 
latter is usually accompanied by an increase in total expenditure which, in turn, increases the 
demand for “money,” e.g., currency, and demand/time deposits.  Thus, even if no international funds 
are channeled through the banking system, the higher transactions level associated with capital 
inflows will lead firms and individuals to increase their bank deposits.  This is, of course, a form of 
loan to banks, but the main motivation is not to lend but to increase the public’s stock of liquidity.  
Contrary to a pure loan to banks, which is largely driven by interest rates, the increase in bank 
deposits that we are referring to here is largely driven by the level of domestic expenditure.  This is 
an important observation, because it implies that as inflows slow down, transactions-linked bank 
deposits are bound to contract.  We will elaborate on this type of cycle a little further, because we 
believe it plays a crucial role in determining the timing and depth of crises associated with capital 
inflows and outflows. 
 
1.  The Banks Factor 
Consider the first phase of a capital inflows episode.  Total expenditure rises and, with it, 
also does bank deposits. If reserve requirements are less than 100 percent, banks will likely increase 
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loans.  Furthermore, since, as argued above, SMFs and consumers are rationed out of the 
international capital market, the new loans are likely to be funneled to SMFs and consumers.  
Typically, these are short-maturity loans but under normal circumstances, particularly when SMFs 
are involved, they are rolled over upon maturity.  Therefore, after one or two years into a capital 
inflows episode, SMFs are likely to regard those short-maturity loans as largely permanent credit 
lines. 
Trouble starts as capital inflows slow down.  Suppose, for example, that capital inflows, KI, 
go from a positive number to zero.  KI is a flow, it measures new borrowing.  Thus, when KI goes to 
zero, it simply means that suddenly no new loans are flowing to the economy.  But it does not mean 
the more dramatic capital flow reversal that would take place if KI became sharply negative.  In a 
nonmonetary economy without banks, a capital inflows slowdown need not cause a major 
disruption.  It may certainly cause stopping some investment projects but it would be hard to 
imagine that it will trigger a deep financial crisis.  After all, borrowers are not allowed to borrow 
more internationally, but by no means are they called upon to make unplanned repayments. 
The situation is, however, much more complicated in a monetary economy with banks.  By 
equation (4), and taking the change in reserves, _R, and GNP as given, a fall in capital inflows, KI, 
induces a fall in total expenditure.  Therefore, given the positive link between expenditure and 
deposits, the decline in expenditure induces a fall in the demand for deposits  Thus, unless banks 
quickly find an alternatively source of funding, they are likely to stop rolling over some of their 
short-maturity loans.  This is a  loan reversal shock!  Some SMFs  and consumers that took 
advantage of the credit expansion associated with the first phase of the capital inflows episode will 
be called upon to pay up in full, no refinancing would be available.  Notice that, contrary to the 
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overall picture in which the economy as a whole is simply not receiving new loans, contraction of 
bank deposits implies that some segments of the economy will be forced to repay some of their 
loans.  Hence, if the government refrains from intervening, this kind of development may lead to 
bankruptcies in the SMFs/consumer sectors and/or to bank failures. 
Since the above type of developments are highly upsetting for policymakers, under those 
circumstances the government usually steps in.  One option is to devalue, inducing a recovery in the 
demand for deposits through higher prices. 
Policy lesson five: Beware of rapid credit growth during the inflow phase of the 
cycle; when capital flows out, these loans may have to be repayed in short notice, 
leading to bankrupcies in the private nonfinancial sector and, possibly, bank failures. 
2.  The Inflation Factor: A Fallacy? Monetary Sterilization 
Previous section has shown how the presence of banks may help to channel some of the new 
credit to sectors that have no access to international capital markets but, at the same time, may 
contribute to the magnification of financial difficulties stemming from a slowdown of capital 
inflows. 
Central banks’ typical reaction to a bout of capital flows is, however, ‘fear of inflation.’  This 
would be fully justified by the logic of previous section, by which a capital inflows episode could 
end up in higher inflation (or at least a sharp price spike).  However, central banks worry because 
they see monetary aggregates sharply rising, especially when the exchange rate is not allowed to 
appreciate.  The concern is that the rise in money supply will fuel inflation.  
We will now argue that (1) even though ‘fear of inflation’ is not groundless, the rise in 
money supply during a capital inflows episode is a natural outcome and may not raise inflation, (2) 
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some inflation may be inevitable if the exchange rate is not allowed to appreciate, and the 
phenomenon has little to do with the rise in money supply per se, and (3) inflation is likely if bank 
supervision is lax. 
African examples of this fear of the monetary expansion associated with the rise in capital 
inflows and increased purchases of foreign exchange were evident in the capital inflow episodes of 
Kenya, in late 1993-1994, South Africa, and Uganda in 1993-94.12  These fears led the monetary 
authorities to engage in large-scale sterilization policies through the open market sale of government 
securities, increases in reserve requirements, or both. An issue which we take up next. 
2.1.  Inflation Fear: A Fallacy.  Perils of Sterilization 
 For the sake of the argument, let us assume that the exchange rate is fixed.  Then, a surge of 
capital inflows that increases total expenditure will tend to increase the demand for money .  This is 
a natural outcome that need not have any impact on inflation.  For example, if the price level is 
determined by the exchange rate, inflation will be equal to the international level, even though 
money supply exhibits a large rise.  A good example that highlights the relevance of this case is 
Argentina after 1991.  In March 1991 Argentina adopted the Convertibility Program by which the 
exchange rate was fixed to the dollar and the central bank made no effort to interfere with the 
generation of money supply.  As a result, the stock of money (M1, for example) increased 
(cumulatively) by 150 percent from 1991 to 1996 but prices increased (cumulatively) by 55 percent; 
hence, the increase in money was three times the increase in prices.  Moreover, the rate of inflation 
(consumer prices) has been negative in the last few months. 
                                                 
12 See Asea and Reinhart (1996) for the cases of Kenya and Uganda and Kahn (1996) for the South African 
experience. 
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Policy lesson six: It is a mistake to forget that under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
money is determined by its demand.  Thus, if it goes up is because the public wants 
to hold more money.  This  is not inflationary and, under these conditions, 
sterilization should not be undertaken.   
The situation would be very different if the exchange rate were flexible.  In the latter type of 
economies, an increase in money supply takes place because the monetary authority actively pumps 
in more liquidity.  The increase in money is not necessarily wanted by the public.  If it is not, people 
will try to get rid of the excess liquidity buying goods, raising their prices and leading to inflation. 
Fear of inflation often leads central banks to try to sterilize the increase in money supply 
through open market operations, i.e., through the absorption of domestic money in exchange for 
domestic public debt (e.g., Treasury Bills).  Under fixed exchange rates, money increases through 
the accumulation of international reserves at the central bank.  Sterilization, thus, is equivalent to the 
central bank acquiring international reserves in exchange for domestic public debt.  The operation is, 
at best, neutral.  If neutral, the public will attempt once again to raise money supply.  This could go 
on forever unless the large reserve accumulation begins to be perceived as potentially dangerous.  
For example, a large stock of international reserves could tempt politicians to use it for large-scale 
public projects, creating either a financial hole in the public sector or, at best, a mismatch of 
maturities.  To cover themselves from this possible bad scenario, investors may require an interest 
rate premium on domestic public debt.  Therefore, the interest rate on domestic public debt will 
exceed that of international reserves, generating a larger fiscal deficit (since those deficits are 
usually borne by the central bank, they are called quasi-fiscal deficits).   The interest rate differential 
led Colombia in 1991, Malaysia in 1994, and Kenya in 1994, among numerous examples 
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momentarily to stop sterilization.13  On the whole, and whatever the reason, central banks seldom 
fully sterilize the rise in money supply.14 
Policy lesson seven: There are “perils in sterilized intervention.”  Persistent and 
widening domestic-foreign interest rate differentials (which act as a magnet to short-
term capital inflows), large quasi fiscal costs, and the temptation for governments to 
spend some of the accummulated international reserves are among the chief perils.  
2.2 Sterilization: Selected African Experiences 
South Africa reacted to the surge in capital flows that began around June 1994 and persisted 
in large scale through December 1995 by substantial sterilization through open market operations--
particularly during the early phase of the cycle.  In the case of Kenya, large-scale sterilization efforts 
began around October of 1993 and persisted through most of the first half of 1994.  For Uganda 
sterilization efforts were particularly intensive in 1993.   
                                                 
13  In the case of Kenya, the rising burden of servicing the public debt became evident, as in the 1993/94 
budget domestic interest payments were 1.5 percent of GDP above the level that was programmed. 
14  For a discussion of many of these issues in the context of a formal model see Calvo (1991). 
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As in several Asian and Latin American countries, sterilization in Kenya took several forms. 
 The Central Bank of Kenya increased its sales of treasury bills during late 1993 and early 1994.  In 
addition, during the October 1993-March 1994 period the statutory cash ratio was raised in three 
steps from 12 percent to 20 percent.  The increased sales of treasury bills and higher reserve 
requirements drove domestic interest rates higher. 15  Since the Kenya shilling was appreciating 
during this period the rise dollar returns is even more dramatic.  By mid-1994 the high level of 
interest rates was increasing debt-servicing costs, generating quasi-fiscal losses and stimulating 
additional inflows. 16  Indeed, domestic interest payments in the 1993/94 budget were 1.5 percent of 
GDP over program.  At that time, it was decided that intervention efforts would be scaled back 
considerably and the shilling was allowed to appreciate further. 17  
The Central Bank of Tanzania, attempted to sterilize some of the monetary consequences of 
the capital inflows by substantial increases in the discount rate, from around 27 percent during 1987-
1993 to 65.9 percent by end 1994. Increases in reserve requirements were also used to reduce 
liquidity during the capital inflow surge. 
In the case of Uganda, sterilization took place primarily through the sales of treasury bills.  
During 1993 and early 1994 there was considerable intervention and sterilization efforts continued 
until April 1994.  Domestic interest rates did not rise, as inflation was falling markedly during this 
period.  However, given the appreciation in the Uganda shilling during this period, returns in dollars 
rose markedly.  Due to the lack of a well-developed secondary market and an insufficient volume of 
                                                 
15This pattern of response prevails in numerous sterilization episodes in Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines, among others (see Reinhart and Dunaway, 1995). 
16For a discussion of the quasi-fiscal effects of sterilization policies see Rodriguez (1991), and Kiguel and 
Leiderman (1994). 
17 See Kimei, Mjema, Tarimo, and Msutze (1997). 
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new issues, it became increasingly difficult for the central bank to pursue sterilization policies for an 
extended period of time.18  The marked decline in interest rates in the post-May 1994 reflects, in 
part, the inability of the central bank to conduct open market operations. 
2.3.  Bank Incentives and Supervision 
                                                 
18  See Kasekende and Kitare (1997) for details. 
 In Section II.1 we illustrated the possibility that a capital inflows cycle may leave 
bankruptcies and financial disruption in its wake.  We will now elaborate on the deeper economics 
behind such phenomenon. 
First, we will consider a case in which the capital inflows cycle would have no dire 
consequences.  This would be so if the larger stock of deposits during the first phase of capital 
inflows cycle are fully invested by the bank in terms of highly liquid international assets (e.g., US 
Treasury Bills).  Thus, as capital inflows slowdown and bank deposits fall, banks simply sell their 
corresponding liquid assets, and no domestic disruption takes place. 
In practice, however, interest rate on liquid assets is extremely low relative to what a bank 
can charge for commercial loans.  To the extent that the interest differential reflects the higher risk 
of a commercial loan, it would not necessarily induce banks to make commercial loans.  However, if 
, for some reason, banks were shielded from some of the risk, the incentives to make commercial 
loans could be hard to resist. 
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Consider the following scenario.  Banks are assured—implicitly or explicitly—by the central 
bank that they will be bailed out for any loss they suffer as a consequence of macroeconomic 
disequilibrium (i.e., systemic shocks or problems).  This scenario is highly realistic in most regions, 
including SSA.  As the Appendix makes plain, banking sector problems have been widespread in 
SSA--as have been large-scale bailouts.  In Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal, and Tanzania 
the cost of the bailout exceeded 10 percent of GDP.19 This scenario is presently being played out in 
Mexico, and Thailand but, as noted above, there are a myriad of examples in SSA bearing it out.  
Banks’ bailout could take several forms.  For example, the public sector could take up bad loans 
(Mexico 1995, Chile 1982), or bad debts could be liquidated (in real terms) by a large inflationary 
spike. 
                                                 
19  The issue of financial crises will be revisited in Section VII. 
As a result, banks will end up engaging in excessively risky activities because the costs will 
be borne by everybody.  Actually, in the face of massive capital inflows into the banking system, 
banks may be induced to relax their loans’ monitoring.  The reason being that if all banks were to 
engage in careless lending, the eventual nonperforming loans problem that is likely to arise will be 
systemic and, thus, will be partly covered by government. 
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Policy lesson eight: The high incidence of banks taking on greater risks in periods 
when access to international capital is relatively favorable, highlights the importance 
of bank supervision during a capital inflows episode.  In case supervision is poor and 
hard to improve in the short run, it may be advisable to increase banks’ minimum 
(remunerated) reserve requirements.20  In this fashion, it can be ensured that banks’ 
are sufficiently liquid, the incidence of nonperforming loans is reduced, and deposit 
withdrawal as capital inflows slow down can be met without serious financial 
disruption.   
A recent IMF (1995) study cites many of the problems in governance, legal, and supervisory 
areas for various countries in Africa and elsewhere.  It notes that many of the banking systems in 
countries in SSA suffer from weak management, uneven accounting practices,  poor auditing and 
reporting and that these problems are often particularly severe in state-run banks.21  Hence, it would 
appear that the risks discussed in this subsection are particularly important for the region. 
 
                                                 
20  This is the opposite of what has been happening with some of the SSA countries.  For instance, Zambia 
reduced reserve requirements from 30 to 3 percent over a short period of time (see Matale, Mwanawina, Matale, 
Mweetwa, 1997). 
 
21 See, for instance, Kasekende and Kitare (1997) for disclosure problems in the Ugandan case. 
IV.  The Role of the Exchange Rate 
The previous discussion assumed that, on the whole, the exchange rate exhibits some 
rigidity.  If the exchange rate is fixed, for example, capital inflows are likely to increase money 
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supply.  In contrast, if the exchange rate was perfectly floating and the monetary authority did not 
intervene in the foreign exchange market, then domestic currency would be supply-determined.  
Domestic-currency denominated deposits may still rise but only through lowering the cash/deposit 
ratio or banks’ free reserves.  Thus, the massive increase in bank deposits observed under fixed 
exchange rates is unlikely to materialize.  Therefore, the question arises, would most of the 
monetary/banking problems go away if the exchange rate were perfectly flexible?  This will be the 
central theme of this section. 
1.  The Financial Angle of Flexible Exchange Rates 
Once again, let us consider a capital inflows cycle where, first, capital flows in, and then 
those flows subside (reversion may take place but is not necessary for the ensuing discussion).  To 
the extent that capital inflows result in a current account deficit and higher expenditure, the 
transactions demand for money will be bolstered, independently of the foreign exchange regime.  
However, if, for the sake of concreteness, the monetary base is fixed by the central bank and the 
money multiplier is constant, then bank deposits are supply determined.  Thus, a rise in expenditure  
will create excess demand for money/deposits.  Hence, equilibrium can only be restored by an 
appreciation of the currency. 
In the simple world where domestic prices equal the exchange rate, capital inflows will lead 
to a fall in the price level.  To the extent that this shock has an unanticipated component, the fall the 
price level may make some old loans impossible to repay in full.  This will particularly be the case if 
loans specify a fixed nominal interest rate which is not indexed to the price level.  The fall in the 
price level automatically lowers the borrowers’ cash inflow and, at the very least, may generate a 
massive need for refinancing.  In the worst-case scenario, loans could become unpayable and 
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bankruptcies follow. 
On the other hand, if domestic prices are sticky and, hence, do not mirror the exchange rate, 
the relevant price level for the demand for money  will have both a domestic and an international 
component. It follows that the same increase in expenditure will now call for a sharper appreciation 
rate.  Under these circumstances, producers of nontradable goods are shielded from currency 
appreciation, but those in the tradables sector will be harder hit than before (due to the sharper 
currency appreciation). 
Policy lesson nine: Financial trouble is not absent under flexible exchange rates and 
it can actually surface at the early stages of a capital inflows cycle.  Can the central 
bank do something to prevent floating rates to wreak financial havoc? The answer is 
“yes.”  The central bank could increase money supply at the beginning of the cycle.  
In this manner, the central bank could prevent the exchange rate from appreciating at 
the beginning of the cycle.  At the end of the cycle, though, it will refrain from 
contracting money supply because, otherwise, the same financial problems 
highlighted in connection with fixed exchange rates will surface here.  Thus, this 
type of monetary management is inflation-prone: money goes up but never goes 
down.  Financial trouble can be avoided but a sequence of capital inflow cycles will 
likely put the economy on an inflationary path.  This need not occur, however, if the 
assistance to the potentailly affected financial institutions comes from the 
government finances rather than through a monetary expansion by the central bank. 
2.  Flexible Exchange Rates and Credibility 
In modern economies, an important component of money is government’s liquid 
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liabilities (e.g., bills and coins).  Government determines its quantity or its price (the exchange 
rate).  It cannot let both be determined by the market because the price level is likely to wander 
in any direction.  Employing popular jargon, one would say that the monetary economy would 
lack a “nominal anchor.”  Thus, under floating exchange rates, government has to set money 
supply.  For the latter not to lead to macroeconomic distortion, it is mandatory that the monetary 
target be well-known and credible (see Calvo, 1989).  However, very few people are likely to be 
familiar with the concept of money supply, and even less with the different monetary aggregates, 
e.g., monetary base, M1, M2, etc.  Thus, the conditions of being well-known and credible are 
unlikely to be met.  These difficulties are magnified if, as in previous section, the central bank 
engages in open market operations to stabilize the exchange rate or any other macro variable. 
In contrast, the situation is different as regards to fixing the nominal exchange rate.  In 
most economies most people are familiar with the concept.  Therefore, fixed exchange rates are 
easier for the public to understand and monitor.  Credibility may still be a problem, though, 
because the public has to believe that the present system will be kept in the future.  To ensure 
credibility, governments may tie their hands by making it difficult to modify the exchange rate 
parity.  This can be done either by domestic regulations (e.g., a law by which the exchange rate 
can only be modified by Congress), or by international agreements (e.g., joining a Currency 
Union like in Europe and the former Franc Zone).  On the other hand, many fixed exchange rate 
regimes end amidst spectacular financial crises and graceful exists from a peg are few and far 
between.22 
3.  Currency Substitution 
                                                 
22 See, for instance, Reinhart and Végh (1996). 
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We define currency substitution as a situation in which foreign money circulates as a 
means of payments.  This situation is common in countries that are undergoing or have 
experienced high inflation.  Inflation increases the cost of holding domestic money and leads 
individuals and firms to look for substitutes. 
Let us denote the domestic component of the supply of money by M and the foreign 
exchange component by M*.  Then total money supply in terms of domestic currency is M + 
EM*.  Thus, a devaluation (appreciation) of the currency increases (decreases), de facto, the 
supply of domestic money.  If, in addition, a simple Quantity Theory of Money applies, and 
domestic prices are proportional to the supply of money, then a devaluation (appreciation) 
increases (decreases) the price level.  Consider the simple world with pure tradable goods in 
which the price level is just equal to the exchange rate, then the above logic implies that 
where the factor of proportionality is assumed to be unity.  Thus, 
Policy lesson ten: Currency substitution signifies a major complication for the 
management of monetary policy under floating exchange rates.  This is so 
because the supply of money is partly a function of the exchange rate.  The 
domestic monetary authority controls the supply of domestic currency but foreign 
currency holdings are set by the private sector.  With access to capital markets,  
foreign currency could actually be borrowed, significantly weakening the nominal 
E, = M E + M *  
. 
M - 1
M = E *  
 
 27 
anchor provided by the domestic component of money supply. 
 
V.  Current Account Deficit: Is It a Problem? 
Popular analysis suggests that large current account deficits are a sign of disequilibrium 
and should be brought under control.  We agree, in principle, that large deficits are a motive for 
concern.  However, we believe that the standard analysis—based on “sustainability” 
considerations—is incomplete and possibly misleading.  In this section we will start discussing 
the sustainability approach to evaluate current account deficits, and then turn to other reasons for 
concern that we feel are more relevant. 
1.  Sustainability Analysis 
The sustainability literature is based on the budget-constraint equation.  Net international 
debt accummulation is the difference between CAD and the growth in real GDP times the level 
of  international debt (both as a share of GDP).  Sustainability analysis focuses on steady states.  
Thus, if we assume no accummulation/decummulation of international debt in the steady state—
sustainable—current account deficit satisfies 
where subscript ∞ denotes “steady state” and b is the net stock of international debt (as a share of 
GDP).  This equation establishes a relationship between steady state debt and current account 
deficit.  If no growth is possible, then the sustainable current account deficit is necessarily equal 
to zero.  In contrast, with positive growth a sustainable current account deficit is possible.  
This analysis is unable to give us a definite answer on CAD∞ until we pin down b∞ .  
 ,b  x growth GDPdollar  constant = CAD ∞∞  
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Recent experience shows that the capital market is reluctant to keep lending to LDCs exhibiting 
levels of indebtedness that exceed 80 percent of GDP (see Williamson (1993)).  Hence, this 
additional piece of information allows us to write the sustainability condition (8) as follows: 
Thus, a country that can be expected to grow at 4 percent per year, cannot sustainably run a 
current account deficit exceeding 3.2 percent.  Since 4 percent was, if anything, an upper bound 
for Mexico, this analysis would conclude that its 8 to 9 percent current account deficits were 
grossly unsustainable.23 
                                                 
23 It should be noted that the same analysis would not single out Argentina as a current account derelict, 
since its current account deficit was about 3.7 percent of GDP in 1994, and growth exceeded 4 percent. 
Presumably, the reason for capital markets to be unwilling to extend credit to LDCs 
beyond 80 percent of GDP is that it may become tempting for those countries to renege on their 
debt obligations.  Temptation, in turn, is likely to be related to the sacrifice associated with 
servicing the debt.  Gross sacrifice of servicing the debt can be measured by the associated trade 
balance surplus.  The previous computation suggests that the capital market becomes nervous 
about a country’s willingness to repay when debt service represents only about 5 percent of 
GDP.  Notice that the net sacrifice from servicing the debt could be much less once one takes 
into account international penalties from debt delinquency. 
Thus, one criticism of current account sustainability computations is that they are highly 
sensitive to the definition of sustainable debt/GDP ratios.  Besides, the above example shows 
that the implied critical sacrifice levels are low when compared to other capital market 
0.80, x growth GDPdollar  constant = CAD∞  
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transactions.  For example, mortgages in the U.S. are easy for a household to get if total 
mortgage payments are less than 25 percent of the household’s income.  Thus, if this ratio were 
also relevant for countries’ debt then, using the above parameters, the critical steady state 
debt/GDP ratio would be 4.16.  Therefore, a country growing at 4 percent per year could run a 
sustainable current account deficit of more than 16 percent of GDP! 
Another even more fundamental criticism of standard current account sustainability 
analysis is that it is constrained to steady states.  Why should these measures be of any relevance 
for a reforming economy?  A formal analysis of the budget constraint relationship underlying the 
above steady state analysis--but appliedt to non-steady-state paths--would allow very large trade 
deficits if they were expected to be eventually followed by equally large trade surpluses (in  
present discounted terms).  As a result, steady state sustainability computations may have little to 
say about the economy’s solvency, which is, or should be, the fundamental issue addressed by 
this literature. 
The last criticism is, in our view, the coup de grace for sustainability analysis, 
particularly when it is applied to countries in transition, which cannot be presumed to be near 
their steady states.  Actually, the use of mechanical formulas to put an upper bound on 
sustainable current account deficits could contribute to panic and confusion.  Few people would 
understand what sustainability really means.  Thus, taking the word at face value could lead the 
public in countries where the current account deficit is deemed unsustainable to conclude that a 
crisis is in the offing, and stage a run against the currency and short-maturity domestic assets.  
This might take place even though there is no fundamental reason for a crisis to occur. 
Policy lesson eleven: Beware of mechanical rules used to compute what is or is 
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not a “sustainable” current account deficit. Such “steady state” rules are difficult 
to apply to countries undergoing transition, which includes most developing 
countries, to the extent that structural reforms are taking place. 
2.  Current Account Deficits and the Risk of a Slump 
Large current account deficits could be problematic if, for some reason, there is a sudden 
and unexpected slowdown of capital inflows and the government cannot offset it by running 
down international reserves.  A sudden cut in the CAD will lead to a reduction in domestic 
expenditure (or absorption).  Thus, the relative price of nontradable goods is likely to fall.  The 
combination of these features (“sudden” and “unexpected”) may cause financial strain in the 
nontradables good sector.  At the new relative prices, outstanding loans may no longer be 
payable. 
This type of financial crisis could actually have a self-fulfilling prophecy characteristic.  
Consider a situation in which no crisis is expected, capital is flowing in and, at the associated 
relative prices, the rest of the world is willing to lend to firms in the nontradable sector.  
Suppose, now, that a crisis occurs somewhere around the world, at a place that has no 
commercial contact with the country in question but that, in the mind of investors, bears some 
resemblance with it. Consequently, international investors stop new loans to the country in 
question until “the dust settles.”  The relative price of nontradables fall, as indicated above, and 
crisis erupts--validating investors’ expectations that causes the initial capital outflow. 
Notice that in the above scenario it is key that international borrowing is aimed at the 
nontradable sector.  If, instead, loans went to finance investment in the tradables sector, then the 
wait-and-see operation would have no impact on the viability of that sector to the extent that its 
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prices are determined in the international market.  Moreover, if the slowdown leads these firms 
to suspend investment projects and the latter had a nontradable component, the price of 
nontradables will fall making the tradables sectors even more profitable. 
Policy lesson twelve: Large current account deficits could be problematic if, for 
some reason, there is a sudden and unexpected slowdown of capital inflows and 
the government cannot offset it by running down international reserves.  A sudden 
cut in the CAD will lead to a reduction in domestic expenditure (or absorption). 
So far, the emphasis has been on current account deficits.  However, an incisive reader 
may ask whether the same kind of problems may not also arise when current account is in 
balance or even in surplus—as a result of a sudden reversal of capital flows, e.g., if KI becomes 
sharply negative.  From a formal point of view, the analysis would be the same.  However, there 
is an important difference between a capital inflows slowdown—whereby positive KI goes to 
zero, for example, the case analyzed in this section—and a capital inflows reversal—where KI 
turns sharply negative.  In the first case, lenders stop lending, something that they can do since, 
under normal circumstances, borrowers cannot force lenders to lend.  In the second case—
capital inflows reversal—lenders want their money back.  But, under normal circumstances, 
lenders cannot force borrowers to repay their loans under the terms of the original contract.  
Lenders can sue and try to attach the collateral, but this is costly and time consuming.  Therefore, 
in practice capital inflow reversals trigger automatic refinancing mechanisms.  Lenders may 
actually be more willing to refinance in a capital-reversal episode if they realize that calling for 
bankruptcy may get them very little.  Consequently, the negative impact of a capital flow 
reversal (which could occur even though the current account is in balance) appear to be less 
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damaging than that of capital inflows slowdown starting from a large current account deficit.24 
 
3.  Current Account Deficits and the Size of the Financial Sector 
As pointed out above, not all sectors in the economy have access to the international 
capital markets.  Part of the task of the domestic banking system is to provide credit to SMFs and 
consumers for whom it may be hard, if not impossible, to borrow in the rest of the world. 
                                                 
24  These observations are akin to the following remark by Keynes:  "[i]t is to be noticed that the position of 
a country which is preponderantly a creditor in the international short-loan market is quite different from that of a 
country which is preponderantly a debtor.  In the former case, which is that of Great Britain, it is a question of 
reducing the amount lent;  in the latter case it is a question of increasing the amount borrowed.  A machinery which 
is adapted for action of the first kind may be ill suited for action of the second."  Keynes (1924, p. 18). 
A CAD usually reflects the existence of new loans from the rest of the world (except 
when the deficit is fully financed by running down international reserves, recall equation (2)).  
Therefore, a capital inflow slowdown—especially if sudden and unexpected—implies that 
sectors which, under normal circumstances have access to the international capital market, are 
suddenly rationed out of that market.  These firms/individuals are typically prime borrowers and, 
hence, have a better credit rating that those that have no access to the international capital 
market.  Consequently, they will be given first priority in the local bank credit market, lowering 
the supply of credit to SMFs and consumers.  The impact on the credit-constrained sectors is a 
function of the size of the capital inflow cut relative to the stock of domestic bank credit.   
We feel that this consideration helps to explain why Argentina was so badly hit by the 
Tequila crisis compared to Mexico, even though Mexico was forced to cut the current account 
deficit by about 8 percent of GDP, while Argentina’s cut did not exceed 2.5 percent of GDP.  
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These adjustments were accompanied by a fall of GDP in 1995 of about 6.4 percent in Mexico 
and 4.4 percent in Argentina.  Thus, the cost of the adjustment per unit of current account deficit 
reduction was more than double in Argentina than in Mexico (i.e., 4.4/2.5 in Argentina against 
6.4/8 in Mexico).  
 
 VI.  Equity market depth and portfolio flows: Why is SSA out of the loop? 
The preceding four sections have discussed various analytical aspects of the policy 
dilemmas that arise when a country is faced with a surge in capital inflows.  In what follows, we 
turn to an empirical analysis of some of these issues for SSA countries. 
  As noted earlier, portfolio capital flows, which have played such an important role during 
the capital flow surge of 1990s in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America have been negligible 
to SSA (South Africa being the exception).25  While as discussed in Section II.2, surges in 
portfolio equity flows are not without risks (in terms of fueling asset price bubbles) we also 
discussed the benefits these inflows bring.  In this section we extend the recent work of Montiel 
and Reinhart (1997) to examine the possible links between capital market structure and the 
volume of portfolio flows a country receives.  In particular, we aim to shed light on why SSA 
has escaped the portfolio investment boom of recent years and ask whether there is some 
minimum infrastructure in bond and equity markets required to promote portfolio flows.  In 
other words, to invest in bonds and stocks you need to have a stock and bond market in the first 
place.  A series of policy actions may be required to bring about the establishment of such 
                                                 
25 See Kasenkende and Kitare (1997) and Matale, Mwanawina, Matale, and Mtweetwa  (1997) for 
documentation of individual case studies. 
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markets. 
To analyze this issue, we have constructed a sample of 18 such “emerging” markets in 
Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand), Latin America (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico), other regions (Czech Republic and Egypt) 
and SSA (Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe).  With the exception of China, this 
list includes most of the developing major capital importers in their respective regions.  The 
sample spans annual data for 1990-96. The data on capital flows is taken from the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook data set. Capital flows in this data set are classified into five categories: 
portfolio flows (bonds and equity), short-term flows, FDI, other long-term flows, and errors and 
omissions.  In what follows we focus on portfolio flows (as a share of GDP). 
To examine whether there is a systematic link between capital flows and the structure of 
the capital market, we introduce a variety of possible proxies for the size and depth of the 
domestic capital market.  The three variables we consider are: the market capitalization of the 
equity market (in U.S. dollars), the number of listed companies in the stock exchange, and the 
trading value (in U.S. dollars). All the data comes from the International Finance Corporation.  
While these variables directly describe the equity market, they are also likely to proxy indirectly 
for the size of the banking sector, as typically countries with undeveloped capital markets also 
tend to have a smaller financial sector.26 
We include these equity market indicators one at a time.  The remaining explanatory 
variables are the sterilized intervention index, the capital control index and the U.S. interest 
                                                 
26Of course, in developing countries the bulk of the financing is done through the banking sector rather than 
the equity or bond market, hence the former tends to be large relative large (see Rojas Suarez and Weisbrod (1994)). 
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rate.27 Because it has sometimes been argued that capital inflows may themselves lead to an 
expansion in the domestic banking sector and/or a deepening of the capital market, we treat these 
equity market indicators as endogenous and use instrumental variables estimator; we use a fixed 
effects estimator and correct for the presence of heteroskedastic disturbances. 
For each dependent variable we report the results for each equity market measure in 
Table 2.  For total capital flows, neither market capitalization nor trading value are significant. 
However, the number of listed stocks is significant at all standard confidence levels and has the 
anticipated sign--the larger the number of listings the higher the capital inflow.  The sign and 
magnitudes of the coefficients and statistical significance of remaining explanatory variables in 
the regression are in line with those reported in Montiel and Reinhart (1997).  Portfolio flows, 
not surprisingly, appear to have the closest link to the stock market variables; both market 
capitalization and number of listed stocks are statistically significant with the anticipated region 
Hence, we can conclude that the absence of developed capital markets in the  is, at a minimum, 
partially responsible for the lack of portfolio flows to SSA.28  
                                                                                                                                                             
  
27 Based on the country-specific information in Montiel (1996), Kahn (1996), and Reinhart and Dunaway 
(1996), as well as Reinhart and Smith (1997), we have also constructed indices to measure the incidence and 
intensity of capital account restrictions as well as sterilized intervention.  The latter provides a measure of the efforts 
to maintain a tight monetary policy in the presence of the capital inflows.  Our policy indices range from 0 to 2 in 
both cases.  See Montiel and Reinhart (1997) for details on these indices. The next section will discuss the 
sterilization issues in greater detail. 
28  For instance, equity markets in Namibia and Zambia (not included in our sample) have fewer than 10 
listed companies. 
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 VII. Capital Flows, Financial Liberalization, Crises, and Contagion 
This section examines the links between financial liberalization policies, capital inflows 
and financial crises.  We also investigate empirically whether capital flows to and from SSA are 
molded by developments in the larger countries in the region--that is, whether there is evidence 
of “contagion” or spillover effects. 
 
 Table 2. Fixed Effects Estimates--Instrumental Variables: 1990-1996 
 18-country panel 
 
 
Dependent 
variable 
 
Sterilizatio
n proxy 
 
Capital 
control 
proxy 
 
US 
interest 
rate 
 
Market 
capitalization 
 
Number of 
listed 
stocks 
 
Trading 
value 
 
Capital account 
balance/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
1.20 
(2.12) 
 
-0.99 
(-0.82) 
 
-0.57 
(-1.87) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
1.40 
(2.38) 
 
-3.94 
(-0.71) 
 
-0.65 
(-1.99) 
 
 
 
0.01 
(2.82) 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
1.32 
(2.33) 
 
-0.98 
(-1.21) 
 
-0.69 
(-1.98) 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.02 
(-0.97) 
 
Portfolio 
flows/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
0.39 
(1.07) 
 
-0.64 
(-1.78) 
 
-0.36 
(-2.45) 
 
0.02 
(2.69) 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
 
0.28 
(1.35) 
 
-0.77 
(-1.67) 
 
-0.44 
(-3.28) 
 
 
 
0.02 
(2.05) 
 
 
 
(3) 
 
0.28 
(0.79) 
 
-0.35 
(-1.70) 
 
-0.44 
(2.71) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.01 
(1.43) 
 
Notes: The countries in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe.  t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  Standard errors have been corrected for general forms of 
heteroskedasticity. 
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As to causes behind surging capital inflows, for the African experiences the most 
common cause, at least historically, has been a commodity price boom (see Cuddington (1989)). 
In some of the recent inflow episodes we have discussed, the boom in coffee prices may also 
have fueled the surge in inflows (see Hadjimichael et. al. (1995)).29  However, in recent years the 
end of Uganda’s civil strife and South Africa’s abandonment of an apartheid government clearly 
can be identified as important domestic causes stimulating the return of flight capital and 
attracting new investors.  Notwithstanding these probable “pull” factors, work by Asea and 
Reinhart (1995) suggests that the sharp rise in domestic real interest rates was a key “pull” factor 
behind the rising capital inflows in both Kenya and Uganda.  Indeed, the statistical significance 
of the sterilization proxy index discussed in Section 2 and presented in Table 2 offers additional 
evidence in that direction, as more aggressive sterilization efforts stimulate larger flows--
particularly of a short-term nature. 
                                                 
29 Coffee accounts for almost all of Uganda's exports and about one-third of Kenya's exports.  During 1992-
93 coffee prices stood at $0.80 a kilo; by mid-1994, on the wake of a frost in Brazil, coffee prices more than trebled 
to $3.20 a kilo (see Sharer, De Zoysa, and Donald (1995)).  
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 But sterilized intervention is only part of the story why domestic interest rates rose 
sharply.  After remaining negative through much of the 1980s and early 1990s, the combination 
of financial market liberalization and efforts to fully or partially sterilize the large scale foreign 
exchange operations of the central bank drove real interest rates higher.  On a risk-adjusted basis 
the increases in real rates may be even more pronounced.  During recent years, countries such as 
Kenya and Uganda have liberalized remaining exchange restrictions on current account 
transactions as well trade and the capital account.  In addition, some of these countries have also 
had successful inflation stabilization programs and somewhat better growth performance.  Taken 
together, it could be argued that the risk premia for these countries may have declined. 30  The 
very timing of the surge in inflows suggests that domestic causes played a crucial role in 
attracting the flows to selected countries in SSA.31   
During the late 1980s, the process of liberalizing and reforming domestic financial 
markets got underway in a number of African countries (see, for instance, Galbis (1993)).  The 
Appendix provides a chronology of the widespread liberalization efforts in the late 1980s and 
1990s and the discussion that follows focuses in the countries that have experienced a resurgence 
in capital inflows in the 1990s. In Ghana ceilings on interest rates were removed in 1987, while 
quantitative credit controls were removed in 1992.  In Kenya, interest-rate ceilings were 
removed in July 1991.  In Uganda, the process of financial liberalization began in July 1988 
when an increase of 10 percentage points was announced on most interest rates.  However, 
                                                 
30Indeed, the model outlined in the next section highlights the links among macroeconomic variables and 
the risk premia. 
31 By 1993 short-term international interest rates had leveled off (albeit, at very low levels) and by February 
1994, these were on the rise, making it unlikely that foreign financial sector developments were the dominant factor 
behind the rise in inflows. 
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interest rates continued to be administratively set by the Bank of Uganda until April 1992. 32   
                                                 
32See Sharer, De Zoysa, McDonald (1995). 
 
In most instances, the financial liberalization was accompanied by a rise in real interest 
rates, often from very negative levels.  However, financial liberalization has not been the only 
factor behind the high interest rates (consider the case of South Africa which liberalized its 
financial sector in the 1980s).  As discussed earlier, the initial policy reaction to the rising capital 
inflows has been to intervene in the market for foreign exchange and sterilize the effects of the 
intervention through either open market operations, increases in reserve requirements, or both. 
2. Financial liberalization and financial crises 
Diaz-Alejandro (1985) was among the first to warn of the perils of financial 
liberalization.  Describing the Chilean experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s, he noted 
how following financial liberalzation banks engaged in greater risk taking (prompted by moral 
hazard problems) often leading to credit booms which, in turn, fueled asset price booms; the 
eventual end to this cycle, he argued, was a financial crash.  Kaminsky and Reinhart (1995) 
document this link between financial liberalization and financial crash for a group of developing 
and smaller industrial countries; they find knowing that a country had liberalized the financial 
sector helps you predict a banking crisis. Indeed, 18 of the 26 banking crises they examine were 
preceeded by financial liberalization within three years.   
The African experience documented in the Appendix appears to fit this mold well, with 8 
cases (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda) of 
banking crises preceded by liberalization.  However, the crises do not appear to be rooted in the 
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credit and asset price boom-bust pattern that is so evident in Asia, Europe and Latin America.  
Indeed, as Caprio and Klingebiel (1996 ) observe, the root appears to be that liberalization 
simply exposes what was already a rotting stock of bank assets.  As in the recent problems of 
Brazilian state banks, the main culprit was the public sector, which borrowed from banks to 
finance unproductive investments. 
3. Capital Flows and Contagion: Concepts and Definitions 
The issue of "spillover or contagion" effects acquired renewed importance in light of the 
Mexican crisis in December 1994 and the effect that this event has had on other emerging market 
economies, particularly in Latin America.33 More recently, the impact of the Thai crisis on other 
East Asian countries has received much attention from the financial press. Relatively little 
empirical analysis exists on how small open economies are affected by economic developments 
in their neighbors and what role financial markets play in the transmission of disturbances.  In 
the wake of the Mexican and Thai crises several countries in Asia and Latin America 
experienced speculative attacks on their currencies, sharp declines in their equity markets, and a 
deterioration in the terms in which they could borrow from international capital markets.  
Herding behavior by undiscriminating investors is often blamed for producing common 
outcomes in countries with very heterogeneous fundamentals. 34  Indeed, it is difficult to trace a 
common thread in key economic indicators in many of these economies.   
                                                 
    33See, for instance, International Monetary Fund (1995). 
34Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) argue that such herding behavior played a prominent role in the 
recent ERM crisis, where in some instances, the attacks on the currencies could be justified by poor macroeconomic 
fundamentals and in others not. 
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However, not all channels through which contagion can take place among small open 
economies require the presence of “animal spirits.”  First, spillovers may arise when two 
economies have highly integrated capital markets.  In this case, shocks to the larger country are 
quickly transmitted to the smaller one through trade in assets; the best and most documented 
example of this type of integration in Latin America may be Argentina and Uruguay (see 
Hoffmaister and Végh (1994), and Talvi (1994)).  Second, trade patterns and arrangements play 
a role in the transmission of shocks (see Ades and Chua (1993)).   In markets where a country 
competes with its neighbors, a substantial devaluation in one country can place the neighboring 
countries at a relative disadvantage--increasing the pressure to regain competitiveness.   
Third, institutional practices may also be a source of spillover effects.  For instance, in 
response to a large adverse shock (such as the Mexican devaluation) an open-end emerging 
market mutual fund before expecting an increasing amount of redemptions will sell off its 
holdings of equity in several emerging markets in an effort to raise cash.  However, given the 
illiquidity that characterizes most emerging markets the sell-off by a few large investors will 
drive stock prices lower.  Hence, the initial adverse shock to a single country gets transmitted to 
a wider set of countries.  This channel of transmission is likely to be of limited empirical 
importance for SSA, as portfolio flows have largely been confined to South Africa.  Fourth, a 
mechanism for such spillovers may be in the form of foreign investors first selecting the larger, 
usually more familiar, countries as a place to invest (it is also the case that the larger countries 
are more accessible to the foreign investor, as equity markets and financial markets are often 
more developed).  As confidence in the region increases, other investment opportunities are 
sought and the range of countries in the portfolio broadens.  Fifth, recent studies on economic 
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growth have stressed the role of technological factors (Chua (1993) and Easterly and Levine 
(1994)) and political instability (Chua (1993)) in regional contagion--the latter of these studies 
suggested these effects were particularly important for Africa.  The five channels of transmission 
discussed thus far suggest that a large shock in a neighboring country can change the 
fundamentals for other countries in that region.  Finally, there are "bandwagon" effects, in which 
investor sentiment does not discriminate among different macroeconomic fundamentals across 
countries (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995)).  In this case, contagion occurs even if the 
fundamentals of neighboring countries are not affected by a shock to their neighbor, since the 
investor lumps everyone together self-fulfilling crises can emerge.  The issue of "spillovers" is 
important for these small open economies, as it potentially makes them vulnerable to not just 
external fundamentals in the form of changes in the terms of trade, international interest rates, or 
the business cycle of large trading partners, but to economic and political developments in 
neighboring countries.  
The next subsection examines whether there is more rigorous evidence of contagion 
among SSA countries. We also examine whether there is evidence of “large neighbor effects” in 
capital flows to and from SSA during the past 20 years.   
4. Capital Flows and Contagion: Evidence from SSA 
In the remainder of the analysis, we turn our focus to SSA and investigate whether there 
is evidence of more durable forms of spillover effects in capital flows to the region. We first 
revisit the topic of the sensitivity of cross-border capital movements to international interest 
rates.  Second, we test for "spillover" effects in the capital account from the large countries to the 
smaller ones along the lines of Calvo and Reinhart (1996).  Lastly, we consider the impact of 
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terms-of-trade (TOT) shocks on capital flows to SSA--the latter being particularly important 
given the heavy primary commodity composition of African exports.   
The group of the larger countries (based on a per-capita income basis) includes Cote 
d’Ivoire, Congo, Gabon, and South Africa while the "small" country group refers to Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. We use annual data for the balance on the capital 
account (including errors and omissions) over the period 1975-96.     
The sensitivity of capital flows to external factors such as international interest rates, the 
business cycle in industrial countries, and rates of returns on a variety of foreign assets, has been 
examined in a number of recent papers. The main conclusion that emerges from these studies is 
that the external variables play a significant role in influencing capital flows.  The capital 
account balance is expressed as a percent of GDP; the real international interest rate used refers 
to a United States 3-month Treasury bill rate adjusted by the rate of inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index--an "ex-post" measure of real returns. The terms of trade measure is the 
IMF commodity price index divided by an index of developing countries imports of 
manufactured goods. 
The number of observations in our panel is 198. We thus focus on a panel of countries 
where the dependent variable is the balance on the capital account as a percent of GDP, while in 
this simplest of settings, the independent variable is a real short-term U.S. interest rate, the 
annual percent change in the terms of trade, and a “large country” index to be defined below.    
 To further examine the role of common shocks, and as an intermediate step in analyzing 
whether there are spillover effects from the larger countries to the smaller ones, we use (as 
before) factor analysis.  This is the same approach as in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) 
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and is similar to the approach taken in Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994), who examine 
the extent of comovement in emerging country funds discounts.   
For the capital account balance-GDP ratio, we construct the principal component indices 
for the entire sample. To test for spillover effects we next examine the dynamic interaction 
between capital account developments between the small and large countries.  Here, we test the 
hypothesis that there are "contagion" or "spillover" effects from the large countries to the smaller 
ones.  As noted earlier, mechanisms for spillovers may be in the form of foreign investors first 
selecting the larger countries as a place to invest in and, as confidence increases, diversifying   
among a broader range of countries or due to proximity and integrated goods and capital 
markets.  We start with the basic relationship that links the balance in the capital account (as a 
percent of GDP) for country i to the real rate of interest in the U.S. and introduce the "large 
country index" of the capital account (denoted by LCI), lagged one period, as an explanatory 
variable for the small countries' capital account balances.  Hence, in equation (9) below the 
dummy variable, d, assumes the value of zero for the large countries and one for the small 
countries.   
The estimation strategy was not complicated by problems of nonstationarity in the 
variables of interest, since the standard (Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit root 
tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. The fixed-effects estimator was used. Hence, in 
equation (1), the intercept for country i, αi, varies across countries, while slope coefficients, the 
βs, are constrained to be the same across countries or in the case of β2, for a subset of countries. 
u + TOT + ]LCI[d + r +  = Y
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tt3-1t2
*
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At the top of Table 3 we report these estimates.  The results indicate that a one percent 
decrease  in real interest rates in the U.S. would increase the capital account balance/GDP ratio 
by 0.32 percent.  However, while the interest rate coefficient has the expected sign--it is not 
statistically significant. These results are at contrast with the findings of earlier studies, which 
largely included Asian and Latin American countries in their sample.   
Table 3.  External factors and "Contagion effects":  
 Evidence from a Panel of Sub-Saharan African Countries. 1975-96 
Dependent Variable:  Balance on the Capital Account as a Percent of GDP 
 
 
 
US real ex-post short-
term interest rate 
 
Percent change in the 
terms-of-trade 
 
“Large country” index 
 
Small countries 
 
-0.32 
 
0.43 
 
0.77 
 
 
 
(-1.39) 
 
(3.31) 
 
(2.96) 
 
Large countries 
 
-0.32 
 
0.43 
 
n.a. 
 
 
 
(-1.39) 
 
(3.31) 
 
 
 
 Notes:  t-statistics are in parentheses.    
 
With regard to contagion effects, Table 3 highlights that the lagged large country index 
of the capital account enters significantly and with a positive sign, suggesting positive spillover 
effects--in line with the regional spillovers identified in Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Frankel 
and Schmukler (1996).  Rising capital inflows to the larger countries would, other things equal, 
tend to eventually stimulate increased capital inflows to the smaller countries in the region.  This 
would tend to suggest, for instance, that a successful stabilization program in one or more of the 
larger countries (which increase inflows to that country) may have positive externalities for some 
of its neighboring countries.  Conversely, it would imply that the civil strife that has plagued 
numerous African countries had dire consequences for the region as a whole. 
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Lastly, terms-of-trade shocks appear to have a significant and positive effect on capital 
flows.  Most likely, these results reflect the numerous booms and busts that have characterized 
the volatile commodity prices--producing a surge in inflows during the bonanza years and crash 
when the price increase is reversed. 
 
 V. Concluding Remarks 
World financial markets are becoming highly globalized. At long last, capital is not just 
flowing out of developing countries, mostly in the form of capital flight, but are now flowing in, 
occasionally in unprecedentedly large sums. Recent experience in Asia and Latin America offers 
us a rich laboratory helping us to understand the pros and cons of capital inflows. 
The conceptual part of this paper has tried to disentangle the main factors that 
characterize and influence capital mobility.  The central lesson is that capital inflows, although 
definetely more desirable than capital outflows, could be harmful to the recipient country if not 
adequately managed.  The main risk is to forget that some of the inflow is temporary and could 
leave in a rush--no region has proven impervious to this risk. The main concern is, thus, not so 
much with the inflow as such but with the potential outflow.  The issue is thus similar to that 
raised by a boom in commodity prices: many countries around the world, notably in Africa and 
Latin America, have made the mistake of taking the 1970's commodity price rally as permanent 
and later paid for their unwarranted optimism. 
 
 47 
Unfortunately, the management of capital flows is not easy. Sterilization is costly and 
capital controls are difficult to implement and may enhance corruption.  The main lesson is that 
fiscal austerity and enhanced bank supervision and/or higher reserve requirements are the best 
responses to a capital inflows episode.  This can be complemented with higher exchange rate 
flexibility, but the latter also has many drawbacks.  Table 4 highlights some of these policies and 
calls attention to some of the “warning signals” a policymaker should heed so as to reduce the 
potential economic costs of a sudden reversal in capital inflows. 
 Table 4. Capital flow managment: Policy lessons for Sub Saharan Africa 
  
 
 On fiscal policy... 
 
• Countries that increased public expenditure in the expectation that the capital inflow is a permanent 
phenomenon, suffer a rude wake-up call as capital inflows come to an end and their temporarily high 
revenues erode.  In the context of SSA, treat all commodity price booms as if they were temporary--treat all 
commodity price declines as permanent. 
 
• Allowing for capital mobility (i.e., cross-border ownership of assets) acts as a disciplining device for 
policymakers, making it more difficult to resort to distortionary taxation.  This argues in favor of removing 
capital controls--at least on capital outflows. 
 
 On debt management... 
 
• A high volume of short-term debt relative to the stock of international reserves can be a major problem if 
the country entered into a balance-of-payments crisis.  Recent examples of the severity of this problem are 
to be found in the Korean and Thai crises.  South Africa, with a short-term debt to reserve ratio of xx is 
particularly vulnerable in this regard.   Short-term debt usually gives rise to the “bunching effect.” 
 
 On banks and asset bubbles... 
 
• Be aware or marked increases in stock or real estate prices fueled by capital inflows and rapid credit 
creation, as these could reflect asset price bubbles.  Except for South Africa, this is not an important issue 
for SSA, where portfolio flows are nil. 
 
• Beware of rapid credit growth during the inflow phase of the cycle; when capital flows out, these loans may 
have to be repayed in short notice, leading to bankrupcies in the private nonfinancial sector and, possibly, 
bank failures. 
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• The high incidence of banks taking on greater risks in periods when access to international capital is 
relatively favorable, highlights the importance of bank supervision during a capital inflows episode.  In case 
supervision is poor and hard to improve in the short run, it may be advisable to increase banks’ minimum 
(remunerated) reserve requirements.  In this fashion, it can be ensured that banks’ are sufficiently liquid, the 
incidence of nonperforming loans is reduced, and deposit withdrawal as capital inflows slow down can be 
met without serious financial disruption.  This is particularly important in SSA where many of the banking 
systems suffer from weak management, uneven accounting practices,  poor auditing and reporting and that 
these problems are often particularly severe in state-run banks.  
 
   
 
 49 
 Table 4 (concluded). Capital flow managment: Policy lessons for Sub Saharan Africa 
  
 
 On monetary policy... 
 
• It is a mistake is to forget that under a fixed exchange rate regime, money is determined by its demand.  
Thus, if it goes up is because the public wants to hold more money.  This  is not inflationary and, under 
these conditions, sterilization is counterproductive.   
 
• There are “perils in sterilized intervention.”  Persistent and widening domestic-foreign interest rate 
differentials (which act as a magnet to short-term capital inflows), large quasi fiscal costs, and the 
temptation for governments to spend some of the accummulated international reserves are among the chief 
perils.  
 
 On the exchange rate regime... 
 
• Financial trouble is not absent under flexible exchange rates and it can actually surface at the early stages of 
a capital inflows cycle.  Can the central bank do something to prevent floating rates to wreak financial 
havoc? The answer is “yes.”  The central bank could increase money supply at the beginning of the cycle.  
In this manner, the central bank could prevent the exchange rate from appreciating at the beginning of the 
cycle.  At the end of the cycle, though, it will refrain from contracting money supply because, otherwise, 
the same financial problems highlighted in connection with fixed exchange rates will surface here.  Thus, 
this type of monetary management is inflation-prone: money goes up but never goes down.  Financial 
trouble can be avoided but a sequence of capital inflow cycles will likely put the economy on an 
inflationary path.  This need not occur, however, if the assistance to the potentailly affected financial 
institutions comes from the government finances rather than through a monetary expansion by the central 
bank. 
 
• Currency substitution signifies a major complication for the management of monetary policy under floating 
exchange rates.  This is so because the supply of money is partly a function of the exchange rate.  The 
domestic monetary authority controls the supply of domestic currency but foreign currency holdings are set 
by the private sector.  With access to capital markets,  foreign currency could actually be borrowed, 
significantly weakening the nominal anchor provided by the domestic component of money supply. 
 
 On the current account... 
 
• Beware of mechanical rules used to compute what is or is not a “sustainable” current account deficit. Such 
“steady state” rules are difficult to apply to countries undergoing transition, which includes most 
developing countries, to the extent that structural reforms are taking place. 
 
• Large current account deficits could be problematic if, for some reason, there is a sudden and unexpected 
slowdown of capital inflows and the government cannot offset it by running down international reserves.  A 
sudden cut in the CAD will lead to a reduction in domestic expenditure (or absorption). 
  
 
As to the empirical analysis, several of our results suggest that capital flows to most of 
Sub Saharan Africa is distinct from flows to other regions--there are important differences.  
 First, the absence of portfolio flows in the region appears to be importantly explained by 
 
 50 
the lack of developed equity markets--African stock markets are shallow or nonexistent, even by 
developing country standards.  The only exception, thus far, appears to be South Africa.   
Second, unlike the evidence from Asia and Latin America many of the financial crises 
that came with financial liberalization was not the product of a credit boom but rather the poor 
state of bank assets at the time of the liberalization--much of it the outcome of lending to the 
government. 
Third, unlike capital flows to Asia and Latin America, capital flows to SSA do not 
appear to be as responsive to changes in international interest rates--instead terms-of-trade 
shocks appear to be the key external shock in influencing capital flows to the region.  
As to the similarities with other regions: 
Fourth, in addition external factors, the capital account balance of small countries 
appears to be affected by developments and trends in the larger countries in the region--these are 
persistent spillover effects which suggest that SSA will require a critical mass of countries 
attracting foreign capital before the region as a whole starts to see a resurgence in capital 
inflows.  Thus, as in other regions, capital flows, like financial crises, have a countagious 
element. 
Lastly, as to the policy responses to capital inflows the selected SSA episodes with 
sterilized intervention mirrored the experiences in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.  
Namely, sterilization resulted in higher domestic interest rates, bigger quasi-fiscal losses, and 
higher short-term capital inflows.  The only notable difference with other regions (South Africa 
exempted) is that the small size of the financial sector in SSA countries limits scope for large-
scale long-lived sterilization efforts. 
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